As a supplement to my report on German Traffic Analysis in
Sixta, I submit the following critical observations. My statements
of history and opinion are unofficial heresay gathered from casual
conversations.
Experience in the German T.A. problem strongly suggest that
T.A., Cryptography and Intelligence should be thought of as a sin-
gle indivisible problem. The processes and products of each one
are interdependent and mutually useful to the purposes of the other
two. Therefore, the organisation responsible for T.A., Cryptography
and Intelligence should be unified at the top and operationally
intimate below. This opinion is sgared ny Lt. Col's. Blair-Conyngham
and Gadd among others.
A brief account of the history of the growth of Sixta substan-
tiates this observation. During the very early days of the war there
was no T.A. done at B.P. Interception control was the responsibility
of the Control Department within Hut 6, where an attempt was made to
satisfy cryptographic intercept requirements without the benefit of
network analysis as it is now known. Intelligence intercept require-
ments, and the organisation responsible for their fulfilment,
developed only after cryptographic success and intercept facilities
permitted. Call-sign analysis and the correlation of radio stations
with order of battle indentification was at best embryonic.
In 1940 before Dunkerque, a staff in France under Towser (now
Col.) and Lithgow (now Lt. Col.) were doing "log reading", though