ledge of networks was accumulated, one by one its applications to
cryptography, intelligence and interception were recognised and
exploited, though the organisational consequences sometimes caused
ill will. Gradually, personnel was recruited and trained, security
regulations devised to permit full cooperation and managerial
policies were formulated with a view towards maximum individual
efficiency, The parts became a whole.
Thus, at the present point in history the integration of T.A.,
Cryptography and Intelligence no longer appears to be a proposition
needing proof, but rather is a basic proposition which may be taken
as the criterion of sound policy and efficient organisation.
It is on this basis, therefore, that I submit my critical obser-
vations on the policy and organisation of T.A. - by - Sixta.
I. The policy of recruiting personnel for T.A. should emphasize
the quality of personnel, not the quantity. Conforming to the usual
pattern of history, in the beginning of such an undertaking as T.A.,
there is available only a very limited number of experienced people.
Therefore, from the whole field of possible T .A. functions only the
most useful and urgent should be undertaken. As the exploitation
of these functions progresses, other possible functions will be
recognised by the small but able original staff. Their suggestions
for organisational changes and expansion should be encouraged and
taken seriously. Only from operational experience canpossible
new functions be properly evaluated in the first instance. Once
operational opinion is agreed that certain specific undertakings